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This paper identifies the main regulatory aspects associated with policies on spectrum 
use and allocation which have led to greater competition in the telecommunications 
sector in Central American countries: Costa Rica (CRC), El Salvador (ESA), Guatemala 
(GUA), Nicaragua (NCA) and Panama (PAN). The research findings help us make 
inferences about the significance of spectrum allocation in the reduction of prices of 
mobile services provided in telecommunications. They also show that spectrum 
allocation policy is one of the most effective instruments in promoting greater 
competition in the telecommunications sector and, consequently, the provision of 
lower-cost services in the region. Spectrum allocations have allowed the general public 
to access communication services and created possibilities for network integration and 
job and business opportunities. The research finishes with a number of policy 


























The telecommunications sector in Central America has shown strong dynamism in 
recent years. In particular, mobile telephony reached an average penetration rate of 107 
lines every 100 inhabitants in 2009 and an average year-on-year price reduction of 22 
per cent for three-minute mobile telephony calls between 2003 and 2009. The 
telecommunications sector has also been shown to be an attractive market for testing 
new wireless broadband technologies. 
 
This dynamism has largely been associated with the process of deregulating the 
telecommunications sector and opening it up to competition in the countries of the 
region, particularly in El Salvador, Guatemala and Panama. 
 
Given the strong correlation between effective promotion of competition in 
telecommunications and the economic performance of countries (Crandall et al, 2007), 
the dynamism of this sector could be expected to improve the region’s competitiveness 
in the international context and lead to the development of other sectors of the 
economy due to the high impact of telecommunications on innovation and 
competitiveness (OECD, 2007, Porter et al, 2008). 
 
One of the most important tools used by regulators in countries in the region to 
encourage greater competition in the telecommunications market is Radio Spectrum 
Management Regulations, i.e. the legal and operational framework governing spectrum 
allocation and defining the rules for spectrum use, transfer and exploitation. 
 
In support of this proposition, Hazlett and Muñoz (2009a and 2009b) have shown that 
the Latin American countries that have allocated more of their spectrum have achieved 
greater benefits in social welfare, measured in terms of consumer surplus. In particular, 
these authors have found that an increase in the allocation of the 100 to 200 MHz 
frequency bands in these countries has resulted in an average price reduction of 22.5-
19.0 ¢ per minute in mobile telephony services. 
 
Therefore, the efficiency of spectrum allocation mechanisms and regulations that 
promote spectrum exploitation would significantly determine the degree of 
development and competition in the telecommunications market. 
In this respect, it must be pointed out that regulatory authorities in developed countries 
have recently taken steps to develop policies that will enable them to implement more 
efficient and expeditious spectrum allocation and management mechanisms, promote 
optimum spectrum use, greater innovation, competition and better services at lower 
prices for consumers. 
 
For example, in order to measure the impact of the exploitation of radio spectrum, its 
use is estimated to have resulted in a profit of £ 42.4 billion in the UK in 2006 (Europe 
Economics, 2006). Faced with similar circumstances in the U.S., the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) established the Spectrum Policy Task Force in 
2002, which is responsible for systematically reviewing the policy on spectrum 
management so as to provide the FCC with advice and recommendations on economic, 
technical, and policy issues related to management and use of this resource. 
 
In this respect, the increase in spectrum allocation in Central American, measured 
against international standards and potential spectrum use based on available 
technology, is one of the key elements that have contributed to greater competition in 
the sector and, consequently, greater economic benefits. Authorities in the region have 
used this tool to encourage the entry of new operators and create better conditions for 
competition in the wireless service sector. 
 
This paper aims to identify the main regulatory aspects associated with policies on 
spectrum use and allocation which have led to greater competition in the 
telecommunications sector in Central American countries: Costa Rica (CRC), El 




The next two sections present a conceptual framework for spectrum management 
policies and a description of allocation mechanisms, followed by a review of the 
international experience of spectrum management. We also review the experience of 
each country in the region in its process of opening up the telecommunications sector. 
Next, we present empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that increased radio 
spectrum allocation is accompanied by greater competition and lower prices in the 
sector. Then, we analyse the implications it has had on the development and use of 
information and communication technologies. The conclusions bring the paper to a 
close. 
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 Belize and Honduras are not included in the analysis due to the lack of reliable sources on 
telecommunications services for these two countries. 
1 Conceptual framework for radio spectrum regulation 
 
One of the main objectives of State regulators is greater growth and competition in the 
telecommunications sector. To do this, they have at their disposal, among other policy 
instruments, mechanisms that help promote efficiency in the allocation and use of 
radio spectrum. 
 
In addition to the regulatory structure in each country, there are changing technological 
and economic factors that make it necessary to redefine the terms for spectrum access, 
which complicates management by the authorities. In particular, rapid technological 
changes accompanied by a hard-to-predict demand prevent them from responding to 
requests for spectrum allocation promptly. 
 
An additional component is the globalization of telecommunications, which increases 
the need to ensure that the regulatory framework will guarantee efficient spectrum 
allocation among different uses in keeping with international standards. 
 
That is why in recent years governments in several countries have made significant 
efforts to include a specific policy on radio spectrum allocation and exploitation on 
their agendas for the telecommunications sector. 
 
Regulatory authorities have resorted to two major routes: the design of spectrum 
allocation mechanisms (ex-ante) and the implementation of management policies (ex-
post) to govern spectrum use, transfer and exploitation. Both have been shown to be 
separate but interdependent routes, that is, the way radio spectrum is allocated largely 
determines the frame of reference for its management and vice versa. For instance, the 
greater the flexibility of spectrum use, the greater the incentives for new entrants in the 
various spectrum auctions. If we look at it the other way round, the more the allocation 
method contributes to spectrum allocation to those who value it most, the greater the 
degree of freedom of the policies governing its use and exploitation. 
  
An increasing number of regulatory authorities at the international level are choosing 
to design and implement market mechanisms for both allocation (auctions) and ex-post 
spectrum management (flexibility criteria for resource exploitation and the 
development of secondary markets). Both stages play a key role – in their respective 
areas – in the development of competition in the markets for final mobile telephony 
services. 
The main factor that largely determines the regulation of spectrum management is 
avoiding signal interference between different spectrum users, for which regulators 
implement a licensing-based model which establishes the users’ rights. The regulatory 
framework associated with these policies is called "command-and-control." Basically, it 
consists of a management model centralized by the regulator whereby frequencies are 
allocated to a limited number of users for purposes defined by the government. Table 1 
summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of using these mechanisms. 






There are growing concerns about this model, mainly because: 
 
i) It does not ensure that radio spectrum is used efficiently (or used at all) once the 
corresponding licences have been issued. 
ii) The allocation model is too slow and inflexible. 
iii) It does not allow licensees to modify spectrum uses for new services. 
iv) It limits innovative uses of new technologies. 
 
In other words, the benefits of this model are reduced in an environment of rapid and 
frequent changes, and in which the responsibility for predicting how the new 
technologies will be used rests with the regulator. 
 
It is therefore increasingly common to see the adoption of spectrum management 
alternatives aiming at market mechanisms and consistent with criteria defined by 
authorities in the field of economic competition, such as: 
 
i) Definition of private property rights for radio spectrum. 
ii) Development of flexible licensing rules. 
iii) Consent for trading the resource. 
iv) Use of auctions as an allocation mechanism. 
 
 Advantages   Disadvantages  
Restrictive licences  
Greater certainty for licensees. 
Greater flexibility for the regulator. 
Easier interference resolution. 





Regulator can consider social value 
explicitly, assuming he has access to 
sufficient information. 
Lack of transparency about opportunity 
costs. Regulator does not have enough 
information on the present and future 




Table 2 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of these mechanisms. 
 




The purpose of these measures is to liberalize spectrum use by making it more flexible 
and allowing the development of secondary markets. Two of the main spectrum 
management models adopting some of these criteria are:  
i) Exclusive use model: The licensee has exclusivity and transfer rights over the use of 
certain spectrum frequencies, with usage rights that are regulated mostly by technical 
standards, but with no guaranteed protection against interference. This model does not 
necessarily require the granting of property rights to private individuals. 
 
ii) Open access or "commons" model: It involves allowing an unlimited number of 
unlicensed users to share frequencies, with usage rights that are regulated by technical 
standards, but with no guaranteed protection against interference. Under this model, 
spectrum is available to all users meeting the technical requirements for access. 
 
Although there is some overlap among the three regulatory models, the most important 
distinction between the spectrum regulated under the last two models and the first is 
that the "command-and-control" model imposes greater restrictions, limiting flexibility 
in spectrum exploitation. 
 
In fact, the implementation of the "command-and-control" model is associated with the 
generation of artificial shortages by regulators. In particular, Minervini and Piacentino 
(2007) identify three types of shortages generated by the controller: 
 
  Advantages                 Disadvantages 
Flexible licences  Easy to move to higher-value uses. 
More innovation 
Risk of interference 
Allocation through 
auctions 
Opportunity cost revealed. 
Allows allocation to user attributing 
the greatest value to the resource.  
Uses information from spectrum 
users, who usually have more and 
better information. Usually 
generates endogenous incentives for 
the effective use of bands.  
Spectrum for uses with high social 
value that is not reflected in provider 
income might not be assured.  Market 
power may lead to inefficient 
allocation. 
Costs of coordinated positions. 
 
i) As a result of not making enough spectrum available. 
ii) As a result of poorly regulated spectrum access, stemming from inflexibility in the 
design of licences and rights to use spectrum. This leads to situations where valuable 
frequency bands may remain unused. 
iii) As a result of inhibiting research and development of mechanisms for reducing 
shortages and using spectrum more intensively and efficiently. 
 
The exclusive use and open access models have received considerable attention from 
experts in the field, as they allow intensive spectrum use and encourage technological 
innovation. Opponents of the exclusive use model point out that users would be 
motivated exclusively by control over access to the resource which will guarantee a 
profit for them, and not by intensive exploitation of the resource. Opponents to the 
open access model point out that open access to spectrum would take a toll on the 
resource as a result of its overexploitation. 
 
According to the OECD (2005), rapid technological change and the convergence and 
growth in demand for spectrum have led to growing discontent with the "command-
and-control" model, which restricts competitive entry, efficient transfer to higher-value 
uses and limits innovation. 
 
In this context, the organization recognizes the significance of the concepts of spectrum 
trading and liberalization in the context of an exclusive use model. Firstly, liberalization 
gives spectrum users the flexibility to adapt to new technologies and offer new services. 
Secondly, trading, together with liberalization, allows markets to decide the amount of 
spectrum to be allocated for the different uses, contributes to faster, more flexible 
access to the resource, including underused or unused spectrum, helps promote the 
development of new technologies that make better use of spectrum, and encourages 
innovation in its exploitation. Moreover, spectrum trading allows the opportunity cost 
of the frequencies allocated by the traditional "command-and-control" model to be 
imputed from those that are traded. Those holding spectrum exploitation rights will 
therefore have incentives to use spectrum more efficiently. This model also provides 
incentives for operators to trade spectrum, since it increases the cost of keeping 
spectrum that they do not need. 
 
The experience related to spectrum trading has been limited to countries like Australia, 
New Zealand, the US, Canada and Guatemala. It should be pointed out that after 
several years working under this model, the interest in continuing the development of 
secondary markets for spectrum still exists in these countries. 
 
Moreover, according to the OECD, there are still serious concerns in many countries 
about radio spectrum trading and liberalization, including: 
 
i) Slack business 
ii) Inefficient use of spectrum 
iii) High transaction costs 
iv) Risk of increased interference 
v) Impact of spectrum trading on anticompetitive behaviours  
vi) Limited impact on investment and innovation 
vii) Impact on international coordination 
viii) Reduced ability to achieve public interest goals 
 
In particular, these concerns have led countries like the United Kingdom to phase in 
spectrum trading, initially adopting this model in service areas such as fixed links and 
fixed wireless access. 
 
It should also be stressed that despite the abundant evidence supporting a shift from a 
"command-and-control" model to market mechanisms, it is important to recognize that 
regulators’ decisions are limited by the structure of the rights historically acquired by 
operators. Modifications to these rights may be interpreted by established companies 
as unfair and occurring after the terms originally agreed upon, so the authority is 
bound to encounter strong opposition to change (Minervini and Piacentino, 2007). 
 
It must be noted that although the benefits of using market tools for spectrum 
management have been widely recognized, the various regulatory authorities recognize 
the need to sacrifice "efficiencies" in spectrum management in order to safeguard the 
provision of certain public services in the areas of public defence, security and 
broadcasting. In particular cases, some other government operations and services 
provided by government agencies are also given priority. 
 
Finally, on account of the importance that regulatory authorities have identified in the 
spectrum management process, specific policies have been designed for this purpose in 
several countries which are revised periodically for adaptation to changing market 
conditions and new technologies. Task forces specializing in this area have also been set 
up whose main role is to analyse, develop and recommend policies aimed at increasing 
competition in the telecommunications markets through the exploitation of radio 
spectrum. 
 
Particular cases, which are explained later, are the US with the formation of a 
specialized task force within the Federal Communications Commission (Spectrum Task 
Force), Canada with the development of guidelines on spectrum auctions (the first 
edition of the document Framework for Spectrum Auctions in Canada is from 1998) 
and regulatory policy (Spectrum Policy Framework for Canada, whose first version 
dates back to 1992), and Australia with guidelines established in the document 
Spectrum Management Principles (2008) and Five-year Spectrum Outlook, 2009-






















2 Radio spectrum allocation mechanisms 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the final outcome of allocation will largely 
determine the ability to regulate competition in the telecommunications sector on an 
ex-post basis by means of spectrum management policies determined by the authority. 
Several mechanisms have been suggested and studied for the allocation of frequency 




Lotteries contribute to transparent and expeditious allocation. However, it involves 
transaction costs and uncertainty in the business plans of companies interested in 
acquiring licences for the provision of services in the telecommunications sector, which 
results in slow network deployment and a fragmented telecommunications market. 
Milgrom (2004) cites as an example the experience of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) in the US in the '80s. Furthermore, due to asymmetries of 
information regarding valuations of radio frequencies, the chances of inefficiencies in 
final allocation are significant and insurmountable (Myerson & Satterthwaite, 1983). In 
this respect, those most interested in obtaining radio frequency licences would 
encounter strong operational, financial and information restrictions, since they would 
have to negotiate with hundreds of recipients of licences scattered across the country. 
 
2.2 Comparative Hearings 
 
Comparative hearings, also known as beauty contests, are some of the most traditional 
forms of spectrum allocation. They come down to allocation based on various issues, 
including technical, financial, legal, administrative and business criteria. It is an 
allocation mechanism that involves a high degree of discretionality, slow allocation, 
lack of transparency, with incentives for corruption and supervision costs for the 
regulator. 
 
Additionally, free allocation of spectrum is equivalent to the State subsidising the 
sector. It is also an inefficient mechanism, given the presence of asymmetric 
information from regulators regarding the assessment of operators applying for 
licences. Even though some participating companies may be benefited by this 
mechanism, the discretionality, slowness and lack of transparency of the process would 
further delay their business plans (Klemperer, 2004) and, consequently, the 




Auctions have been shown to be efficient when allocating objects to agents receiving the 
most favourable assessments in a transparent, expeditious manner. It also provides the 
State with a source of revenue. 
 
The implementation of auctions as a spectrum allocation mechanism has come in for a 
great deal of criticism. In particular, it has been pointed out that they involve a transfer 
in the prices of services and/or reduced levels of investment in the sector. The 
significance of both effects has been played down by several specialists, who argue, for 
instance, that investments in the sector have been greater in spectrum areas for which 
more has been paid (Klemperer, 2004), and the conditions of demand for 
telecommunications services should be exceptional for sunk costs in the purchase of 
licences to affect the development of the sector (Burguet & McAfee, 2008). Finally, if 
the prices of telecommunications services are determined on the basis of supply and 
demand in the market, the operators will place their bids in the auction on the basis of 
the prices at which they will be in a position to offer their services. That is, the bids will 
depend on prices and not the other way round. 
 
The greatest difficulties arising when developing the rules governing auctions are, for 
one thing, the danger that discouraging new entrants and/or predation by incumbents 
will result in a highly concentrated telecommunications market. Another drawback is 
that the possibility of collusion among participants may affect revenue-raising capacity, 
even if it does not necessarily affect efficiency. Finally, the financial capacity of some 
bidders may be undermined by the phenomenon known as "winner's curse", whereby a 
bidder may win the auctioned object after overestimating its value. 
 
The appeal of auctions has also resulted in the State’s interest in delaying spectrum 
allocation processes to let the price of spectrum rise and increase the likelihood of 
greater extra resources for the purchase of licences for spectrum exploitation. However, 




2.3.1 Conditions contributing to competitive auction markets  
 
The following is a set of features suggested by Klemperer (2005) that make the 
existence of a competitive bidding market possible: 
 
i) The winning bidder gets all or none of the object being auctioned. This causes the 
relationship between the price offered and the amount purchased to be nonlinear, and 
sometimes erratic. 
ii) Each bidder’s capacity for acquisition in a period is less than the size of what is 
auctioned. 
iii) The outcome of an auction does not significantly determine the outcome of any 
other auction. 
iv) There are no significant barriers to entry by other competitors. 
v) There is a bidding process or auction mechanism. 
 
The first three requirements imply the possibility of Bertrand price competition. The 
fourth feature additionally allows the existence of potential competitors to ensure 
competition. Therefore, the presence of a bidding process does not per se ensure that 
bidders do not have market power. 
 
2.3.2 Incentives for the promotion of competition in auctions 
 
The promotion of competition in auction markets lies in the incentives provided by 
each auction format for the participation of new entrants and the removal of collusive 
behaviour and predatory practices. Similarly, the auction method used can facilitate the 
process of information aggregation and disclosure that will contribute to better 
allocation of auctioned items and to alleviating the "winner's curse" phenomenon. 
Some of the features of different auction formats that may help to compound or 
alleviate some of these problems are listed and discussed bellow. 
 
i) Ascending price auctions tend to discourage the entry of new participants in auctions, 
while first-price auctions encourage it. The reasoning is as follows: In ascending price 
auctions, a strong bidder (e.g., the incumbent) will remain active until the end of the 
auction and weak bidders will therefore not have the (ex-ante) incentive to incur costs 
to prepare their bids. In the presence of such type of asymmetry, weak bidders in a 
first-price auction will instead have a chance to win the auction due to the incentives to 
be more aggressive (Maskin & Riley, 2000; Landsberger et al., 2000 and Klemperer, 
2004). 
 
ii) Another way to promote the participation of new entrants is by reducing the costs of 
participation. In this regard, auctioneers can reduce them by providing as much 
information available as possible on the object being auctioned. They can also 
encourage weaker bidders through mechanisms such as bidding credits, whereby 
bidders are allowed to pay a fraction of their winning bids, or by providing new bidders 
with exclusivity in the acquisition of certain licences. Another way of promoting entry is 
by establishing purchasing caps on incumbents. Regarding the setting of upper limits, 
the FCC recently decided to implement case-by-case analyses rather than drawing a 
clear ex-ante line on how much each bidder can acquire (spectrum caps). Finally, 
another way of promoting entry is by dividing objects being auctioned into smaller 
pieces. 
 
iii) In the 3G auction in Europe, after the Netherlands' failure to attract more 
participants using an ascending auction, Denmark managed to increase the number of 
bidders by deciding to use a uniform-price auction, keeping the number of participants 
secret. In the case of the UK auction, Klemperer (2004) suggested the use of an auction 
that he called Anglo-Dutch auction, which would be able to attract new participants. 
The auction involves starting a uniform-price auction until there are only two bidders 
left. They are then asked to participate in a first-price auction, taking the third highest 
price as the reserve price. This method was not implemented, since in the end, a large 
number of participants turned out. 
 
iv) Ascending price auctions also tend to promote collusive behaviour, particularly in 
the case of multiple-unit auctions or when a single unit is auctioned repeatedly. In the 
process of radio spectrum auctions, the FCC decided to implement a process of 
ascending price auction with a common finish time. According to the auction designers, 
the fact that the auction was simultaneous allowed bidders to gradually piece together 
their spectrum licence portfolios across the US. However, signalling processes were 
observed indicating serious attempts at coordination among the bidders. This led to the 
inclusion of new bidding rules such as the need for predetermined increases in bids 
(Cramton & Schwartz, 2004). 
 
v) Other factors that contribute to collusion are the disclosure of the bidders’ identities 
or the possibility of signals being sent. Factors that weaken collusive agreements 
include the use of sequential auction finish times and the setting of auctioneer reserve 
prices. Regarding this mechanism, credibility is important in the event the object is not 
sold. Furthermore, the setting of very high reserve prices may discourage the 
participation of new entrants. 
 
vi) Two major problems are noticeable in auctions for multiple objects in the ascending 
price formats: demand reduction and exposure. The problem of demand reduction has 
to do with high bidders having an incentive to reduce their demand in order to pay less 
for what they get. The problem of exposure has to do with bidders being interested in 
getting a set of objects and willing to pay a "premium." Bidders with such interests are 
exposed to placing excessive bids to acquire some of the set of licences in which they 
are interested, sometimes failing to acquire the full package due to financial 
restrictions. To address this problem of exposure and alleviate the problem of demand 
reduction, the FCC recently designed and implemented combinatorial auctions 
(Cramton et al., 2006). 
 
vii) The ascending price auction also allows information aggregation and disclosure in 
multiple-unit auctions (preferably when they are complementary) and alleviates 
"winner's curse" problems. In this respect, the policy of the auctioneer disclosing 
information on the characteristics of the object being auctioned applies. 
 
viii) The existence of a resale market encourages the participation of new agents and 
















3 Experience of opening up telecommunications, 
spectrum management and mobile telephony services 
 
The following is a brief description of the experience of each of the selected countries of 
Central America related to the opening up of the telecommunications sector, spectrum 
allocations and their impact on mobile telephony services. Table 3 shows a set of basic 
statistics on mobile and fixed telephony for each of the Central American countries 
analysed. Additionally, this section ends with a description of the experience in the 
main regions that began the process of opening up the telecommunications sector at 
the international level (the United States and the European Union). 
 
Table 3 Basic statistics on fixed and mobile telephony (2009) 
 
(1) Data collected from the websites of the main mobile telephony providers in each country 
(2) Data collected from telecommunications regulators in each country. 
 
(3) Author’s calculations based on data collected from regulatory agencies in each country. 




3.1 Costa Rica 
 
The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) is the public utility that provides 
basic electricity and telecommunications services in Costa Rica. The ICE is a state 
monopoly that has managed both fixed and mobile telephony and the provision of 
broadband services through its subsidiary Radiográfica Costarricense (RACSA). 
Although the Costa Rican government tried to liberalize the sector in 2000, public 
demonstrations organized mainly by unions associated with the ICE prevented 
progress in this process. The exploitation of telecommunications has therefore 
remained exclusively in the Costa Rican State’s hands
2
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0.056  42.2  0.169  32.3  10000  117  5  10564  
El 
Salvador  
0.013  122.4  0.021  17.8  2668  177  6  7355  
Guatemal
a  
0.063  123.5  0.189  10.1  3524  183  14  4831  
Nicaragu
a  
0.007  54.7  0.487  4.8  5339  134  6  2892  
Panama  0.082  175.8  0.247  15.5  3727  125  4  11776  
 
 
In 2006, the General Telecommunications Act was passed to help modernize and 
streamline the telecommunications sector, which in turn led to the creation of SUTEL 
(Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones, or Superintendency of 
Telecommunications) as regulator of the sector, operating under ARESEP (Autoridad 
Reguladora del los Servicios Públicos, or Regulatory Authority for Public Services). 
SUTEL was created to regulate, oversee, enforce, monitor and control the legislation on 
telecommunications. In addition, the Fonatel (Fondo Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, 
or National Telecommunications Fund) was created as a parafiscal levy mechanism for 
the purpose of promoting universal access and universal service and serving vulnerable 
low-income groups, which the Act establishes as some of its fundamental principles in 
the telecommunications sector. 
 
As regards its advances in telecommunications, Costa Rica digitized its fixed network in 
2005 and has the highest fixed telephony penetration rate (32 every 100 inhabitants) in 
the region. As regards radio spectrum use, Costa Rica decided to reserve its 
management and economic exploitation and prevented the entry of new operators. 
However, the Costa Rican government has continued to increase spectrum release to its 
only operator – from 93 MHz in 2003 to 117 MHz in 2009 – for commercial use. These 
deliveries were accompanied by a reduction of approximately 7% in the prices of 3-
minute calls and an increase in penetration rate from 19 to 42 lines every 100 
inhabitants during the same period. However, the almost nonexistent supply of prepaid 
cards, the absence of competition, poor service, inefficiency and limited supply of new 
mobile lines have probably been the reasons for the low penetration rate of mobile 
telephony services in the Costa Rican population, which remains the lowest in the 
region. Finally, due to the same inefficiencies in the mobile telecommunications 
subsector, mobile broadband services in 2009 were virtually nonexistent. 
 
3.2 El Salvador 
 
El Salvador began to undergo a regulatory change in telecommunications in 1996. That 
year, SIGET (Superintendencia General de Electricidad y Telecomunicaciones, or 
Superintendency of Electricity and Telecommunications) was created as the industry's 
new regulatory body, the Telecommunications Act was passed to reform the policies in 





Under the Act, the main responsibilities of the SIGET are monitoring spectrum use, 
detecting and limiting illegal spectrum uses and settle disputes arising between 
participants. The spectrum allocation strategy was similar to that implemented by 
Guatemala, with the difference that in El Salvador, licensees are supposed to pay 
annual fees for spectrum use. Between 2003 and 2009, radio spectrum availability 
increased from 138 Mhz to 177 Mhz. These new releases of spectrum have been 
accompanied by 34% year-on-year reductions in average prices and an increase in 
penetration rate from 16 lines to 107 lines every 100 inhabitants. However, fixed 
telephony penetration is still lagging behind, remaining at 15 lines every 100 
inhabitants. The combination of these two phenomena caused the ratio between mobile 
and fixed lines to reach 7 mobile lines per fixed line in 2009. 
 
Overall, the release of spectrum and the regulatory framework that was implemented 
facilitated the entry of six mobile telephony operators in a market of 7 million people, 
most of whom live in poverty. Consumers today have at their disposal different types of 
mobile phone technologies that allow them to access joint digital telephony, radio 




Like El Salvador, Guatemala changed the regulation of telecommunications in 1996. 
Before then, the telecommunications market was regulated by an agency that 
controlled the frequencies below 800MHz, while a state-owned company controlled 
frequencies above 800Mhz. Additionally, a private company obtained the exclusive 
right to mobile telephony in 1989, with a share of its profits going to the state-owned 
company. 
 
Since 1996, when the General Telecommunications Act came into force, the 
telecommunications sector in Guatemala has experienced a spectrum policy 
liberalization process based on two principles: The first principle is that all unallocated 
spectrum may be requested by any agent for the required purposes. The second 
principle is that the user is given the right to exploit the spectrum, which includes 
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 Some key aspects of the liberalization of the telecommunications sector in El Salvador are 
similar to those seen in Guatemala, which we will see later. 
changes in spectrum use over time. This contributes to the emergence of secondary 
spectrum markets. 
 
In addition to establishing new regulations, the General Telecommunications Act 
creates the SIT (Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones, or Superintendency of 
Telecommunications), whose main responsibilities are to manage and monitor radio 
spectrum and resolve any disputes that may arise between different parties owning 
spectrum, with a view to optimizing resources in the telecommunications sector in a 
competitive environment. 
 
The SIT established the way in which every public auction should be carried out, with 
one or several rounds. Should the SIT decide to fragment a band, the fractions must be 
auctioned simultaneously with multiple rounds and a clear specification of the 
minimum acceptable increases and the way to close the auction. As regards the amount 
of spectrum released, Guatemala is the country with the largest amount released in the 
region, with an increase from 140MHz in 2003 to 183MHz in 2009. These releases 
were accompanied by price reductions for three-minute mobile calls (9% year on year) 
and greater service penetration (124 lines every 100 inhabitants). 
 
As a result of the opening up of the telecommunications sector and the introduction of 
regulations regarding the management of radio spectrum, the penetration of fixed 
telephony in Guatemala contrasts with that of mobile telephony, like in El Salvador. 
The penetration of fixed telephony in 2009 was only 10 lines every 100 inhabitants, 
















The regulator of telecommunications services in Nicaragua is TELECOR (Instituto 
Nicaragüense de Telecomunicaciones y Correos, or Nicaraguan Institute of 
Telecommunications and Postal Services), whose responsibilities are regulatory design, 
technical planning, monitoring and enforcement of legal regulations in 
telecommunications services. It also regulates and manages radio spectrum, which 
includes issuing permits to interested parties. The General Telecommunications and 
Postal Services Act passed in 1995 is the legal framework governing the sector and the 
activity of TELECOR, which promotes competitive practices. 
 
The process of privatization of the state monopoly of telecommunications in Nicaragua 
(ENITEL), which had begun in 1995, was completed in 2001. In 2004, the SISEP was 
created as the public services watchdog for the purpose of bringing together the 
regulators of utilities (water, electricity and telecommunications) and for coordination 
with the body responsible for promoting competition. This created an atmosphere of 
institutional confusion as to which body to respond to, as TELECOR operates under the 
Executive and SISEP under the National Assembly. This situation, coupled with the 
political tension in the country, has resulted in institutional weakness when it comes to 
identifying, investigating and penalizing anti-monopoly practices. 
 
Given this regulatory framework for telecommunications, the development of 
telecommunications in Nicaragua is lagging far behind that observed in the region. 
Nicaragua still has the lowest fixed telephony penetration rate in the region with 5 lines 
every 100 inhabitants, while the penetration rate of mobile telephony is 54 lines every 
100 inhabitants. The significant mismatch between fixed and mobile 
telecommunications caused the ratio between mobile and fixed lines to reach 10 mobile 
lines per fixed line in 2009. 
 
However, the opening up of the sector to competition and the spectrum allocation 
policy (85 MHz to 134 MHz) allowed an increase from 8 to 54 lines every 100 
inhabitants in the penetration of mobile telephony from 2003 to 2009 and a 




The telecommunications market in Panama has gone from being an unregulated 
private monopoly until 1969 to being a state monopoly from 1970 to 1996, only to 
become a regulated private monopoly between 1997 and 2002, and, finally, a 
competitive market as of 2003. 
 
The National Authority of Public Services (ASEP) is the entity charged with regulating 
the different utilities (water, electricity, telecommunications and television). ASEP's 
responsibilities are, among others, to allocate and monitor the use of radio spectrum, 
issue licences and concessions, and promote competition in the telecommunications 
sector. 
 
The opening up of the telecommunications sector to competition in mobile telephony 
caused the penetration of mobile telephony to increase from 36 lines every 100 
inhabitants in 2003 to 175 lines every 100 inhabitants in 2009, which positioned it as 
the country with the highest penetration rate in the region. This disparity between the 
growths of mobile telephony and fixed telephony has resulted in a ratio of 17 mobile 
lines per fixed line. Furthermore, the systematic release of spectrum for use in mobile 
telephony services since 2003 was accompanied by a substantial year-on-year price 
reduction of 20% for three-minute calls until 2009. 
 
3.6 Radio spectrum regulation experiences in the rest of the world  
 
For some years, some countries have been making significant efforts to include policies 
on radio spectrum allocation and exploitation among their priorities regarding the 
telecommunications sector. The particular cases of the United States and the European 
Union are discussed below. 
 
3.6.1 United States of America (USA) 
 
In 1999, the FCC laid down the general principles of spectrum management. The 
establishment of these principles led to the consolidation of the US as a leader in the 
use of market mechanisms for allocation and award of licenses for spectrum 
exploitation. In recent years, this agency has promoted liberalization in the following 
ways: 
   
i) By establishing a task force (Spectrum Policy Task Force) to make specific 
recommendations on ways to evolve from a "command-and-control" mechanism to a 
more integrated market-oriented spectrum policy. 
ii) By developing the secondary market initiative to remove regulatory barriers and 
facilitate efficient spectrum reallocation to higher-value uses. 
iii) By allocating Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) on the 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-
2155 MHz bands. Simple interference mitigation rules are defined and 2G and 3G (or 
4G) migration is simplified. 
 
3.6.2 European Union 
 
A few years ago, the European Union (EU) embarked on a spectrum reform following 
the recommendations of the report by the Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) on the 
implementation of concepts such as spectrum trading and liberalization. 
 
In most EU countries the "command and control" model remains dominant for 
spectrum allocation. Some countries, however, solve competition issues by means of 
auctions. 
 
The amendments to spectrum management seek to make regulations in Europe less 
restrictive and strengthen spectrum management in EU member states. In fact, 
according to the European Commission, the introduction of spectrum management 
mechanisms based on market mechanisms, coupled with more flexible usage rights, 
might add 8-9 billion euros per year to the telecommunications market in the member 
states. 
 
The opening up of frequency bands set aside for mobile communications, such as those 
for 3G mobile services, is one of the Commission’s initiatives. The liberalization of 













4 Spectrum allocation and competition in the 
telecommunications market 
 
The description given of the experience of Central American countries in their process 
of opening up telecommunications is a sign of a relationship between the release of 
radio spectrum and prices, competition levels and penetration levels of mobile 
telephony. 
 
In order to establish a more formal relationship between spectrum allocation and its 
impact on the telecommunications market, we must take as a conceptual basis a 
theoretical model with two or more companies which, as a first stage, decide how much 
to invest in an essential input for production – in our case, the amount of available 
radio spectrum – and, in the second stage, decide to start a Bertrand price competition 
for the service (Hazlett and Muñoz, 2009b). In this way, each company's investment in 
availability of the key input in the first stage determines its ability to compete in prices 
in the second stage. 
 
Since the structural estimate of this equation system requires specific information that 
we unfortunately do not have, we will now go on to review a series of indicators for 
Central American countries in the area of spectrum allocation and competition in the 
telecommunications market, which can be interpreted in the light of the model briefly 
described. 
 
Figure 1 shows spectrum allocations for the years 2003 and 2009, measured in 
megahertz (MHz). In all these countries there is a significant increase in the release of 
radio spectrum, with a regional year-on-year average of 7.5%. 
 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the average prices of wireless calls, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of wireless telephony market concentration, and mobile phone 
penetration rate, respectively. During this period, the average reduction in the price of 
three-minute mobile phone calls was 22.8% year on year, the HHI declined by 1.5% 










Source: Sutel (CRC), Siget (ESA), SIT (GUA), Telcor (NCA), ANSP (PAN) 
                   Figure 2 Average price per minute in 2003 and 2009 (US$/min) 
                                     Source: Sutel (CRC), Siget (ESA), SIT (GUA), Telcor (NCA), ANSP (PAN) 
 
 
Figure 3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of telephony market concentration  
  
                                                                     in 2003 and 2009 
Source: Sutel (CRC), Siget (ESA), SIT (GUA), Telcor (NCA), ANSP (PAN) 
                              Figure 4 Percentage rate of mobile phone penetration  




Figure 5 below provides a graphic representation establishing a linear relationship 
between the amount of spectrum allocated and average prices. The figure confirms the 





Then, figure 6 shows us a linear relationship between the amount of spectrum allocated 
and the degree of concentration measured by the HHI. The negative relationship 
between both variables, although weaker than the previous one, shows an improvement 
in the sector’s competition indices, with the exception of Costa Rica, where the opening 
up of telecommunications has been lagging behind the other countries in the region. 
 
Finally, figure 7 shows a linear relationship between the amount of spectrum allocated 
and the degree of mobile phone penetration in the population. The positive relationship 
between both variables is a sign of improvement in penetration rates in countries in the 
region. 
  
Figure 5 Radio spectrum allocations in 2003 and 2009 (MHz) and their relation to           
                                         average prices per minute (US$/min)                           
 
Prices per Minute                                                       Spectrum 
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 Linear regressions developed for figures 5, 6 and 7 show correlations between the variables 
represented. These correlations, however, would require a more thorough econometric analysis, 
because other significant variables that could reduce the degree of relationship would not be 
included. An analysis of this nature required more specific and reliable data and a structural 
equation system that would take into account elements of endogeneity and correct specification. 
Figure 6 Radio spectrum allocations in 2003 and 2009 (MHz) and their relation to the   
                                           Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market concentration 
 
HHI Spectrum 
Source: Sutel (CRC), Siget (ESA), SIT (GUA), Telcor (NCA), ANSP (PAN) 
 
 
Figure 7 Radio spectrum allocations in 2003 and 2009 (MHz) and their relation to the  
                 penetration percentage rate  
 
Penetration percentage                                  Spectrum  
Source: Sutel (CRC), Siget (ESA), SIT (GUA), Telcor (NCA), ANSP (PAN) 
 
 
These findings help us make inferences about the significance of spectrum allocation in 
reducing the prices of mobile services provided in telecommunications. The results 
show us that spectrum allocation policy can be regarded as an effective tool for the 
promotion of greater competition in the telecommunications sector and, consequently, 
for the provision of lower-cost services in the region. Furthermore, spectrum 
allocations have allowed the general public to access communication services, opening 
network integration possibilities as well as job and business opportunities. 
 
One way to interpret these results in the region was posited by Hazlett, Ibarguen & 
Leighton (2007). According to these authors, the regulatory framework for spectrum 
management and use has implications for consumer welfare and efficiency in the 
sector, since spectrum is an essential input in the production process of 
telecommunications services. 
 
Hazlett et al. specifically discuss the impacts of granting exclusive spectrum property 
rights on the sector’s competition levels, mobile telephony prices and the increase in 
mobile telephony services. The authors found empirical results by using annual data 
from 2000 to 2004 on the following Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 




Excluding El Salvador and Guatemala, the average spectrum allocated in these 
countries was 90 Mhz, while Guatemala and El Salvador had allocated 140 MHz and 
138 MHz respectively, which positioned them above the average of the other countries 
considered in the sample. As regards Nicaragua and Panama, they were below the 
average levels, at 40-60 Mhz. The authors found that the difference in spectrum 
allocated in Guatemala and El Salvador was significantly different compared to the 
other countries in the sample. 
 
The authors also found that the relationship between the logarithm of the allocated 
spectrum (MHz) and the logarithm of GDP (thousands of dollars per capita) was 
positive, and the coefficient of the Liberalization variable was significant in the 
regressions developed to account for the relationship between the above-mentioned 
variables. While Guatemala and El Salvador were above the regression line, Nicaragua 
and Panama were below it. 
 
The authors also analyzed the spectrum allocated every one thousand dollars of GDP 
per capita, and found that the liberalization process had increased the spectrum 
available to providers of mobile services on 16 MHz every one thousand dollars of GDP 
per capita. Guatemala and El Salvador were above the average, while Nicaragua was 
average and Panama was below the average and below the other countries that were 
below the average. These results confirmed the hypothesis that a liberal regulatory 
framework implied a larger amount of allocated spectrum. 
 
To analyze the effect of competition on the mobile telephony sector, the authors 
calculated the HHI for that sector. The average of countries excluding Guatemala and 
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 Costa Rica was excluded from the sample because there is a state monopoly in the provision of 
mobile telephony, which makes the interpretation of the data difficult. 
El Salvador was 4892. At the time, the indices of Guatemala and El Salvador were in 
the region of 3000-4000, while Nicaragua had an index in the region of 6500-7000, 
and Panama’s index was similar to the calculated average. This result showed that 
liberalization caused the index to fall. 
 
The authors used the mobile service providers’ average revenue per minute as a proxy 
for the price of such services. Guatemala was below the average of countries excluding 
Guatemala and El Salvador, while El Salvador was just above the average of 0.25. In 
addition, the average revenue per minute of Nicaragua and Panama was above the 
average price, these countries having had the highest values in the sample. The results 
of the regression analysis performed by the authors allowed them to conclude that 
liberalization caused average revenue per minute to decrease, but this result was only 
statistically significant for Guatemala when El Salvador was excluded from the sample. 
 
Finally, to measure the level of production in mobile telephony, the authors defined it 
as total minutes of mobile phone use per person per month. Guatemala was above the 
average for countries in the sample excluding Guatemala and El Salvador, while El 
Salvador was below. The value for Panama was the same as the average and Nicaragua 
was below the average and below all the other countries in that situation. The authors 
proved that there was a positive relationship between total minutes of mobile phone 
use per person per month and GDP per capita, measured in thousands of dollars. 
Guatemala and El Salvador were above the regression line, Panama was right on the 
regression line and Nicaragua was below it. They proved that the liberalization process 
in Guatemala and El Salvador was associated with an increase in minutes of use (per 
person per month per thousand dollars of GDP per capita) and the effect was 
statistically significant. 
 
From the description and analysis in the previous section, we can infer that spectrum 
management policies have a significant impact on the development of 
telecommunications, particularly mobile telephony, as well as the opportunities to 
experiment with other wireless media, such as mobile broadband. 
 
Lower prices in mobile telecommunications also involve improvements in the use of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) (fixed and mobile telephony, and 
broadband), as revealed by the study by the ITU (2010). This is illustrated in Figure 8, 
which shows a relationship between ICT price basket values and the ICT development 
index for countries in the region in 2008. 
 
Figure 8 ICT Development Index (IDI) and its relation to prices in 2008 
 
Source: ITU (2010) 
  
 
ICT price basket value                                                             ICT Development Index 
 
Notably, Costa Rica’s best performance as regards the IDI is due to the strong 
performance of fixed telephony compared to Guatemala and El Salvador, even though 
these countries have fared better in mobile phone penetration. 
 
Similarly, the economic growth of gross national product (GNP) per capita and human 
development indices (HDI) are accompanied by lower ICT price basket values. We 
illustrate this relationship with figures 9 and 10. In 2008, lower ICT price basket values 












Figure 9 Value of the ICT price basket and its relation to GNP per capita 
 
GNP per capita USD                                                                    Value of the ICT price basket 
                                                        Source: ITU (2010) 
 
 
Figure 10 Value of the ICT price basket and its relation to the HDI in 2008 
 
Human Development Index (UNDP)                      Value of the ICT price basket 
Source: ITU (2010) 
 
To conclude, I will briefly analyze the development of mobile broadband services in 
Central America. Although the use of Internet services has grown in penetration, 
 
 
mobile broadband services are still lagging far behind in the region. This can be seen in 
Figure 11, which shows the disparity between Internet and mobile broadband 
penetration rates in the region in 2008. 
 
Broadband service has primarily been tied to the development of mobile telephony 
services. Therefore, the mobile telephony market must mature before growth can be 
noticed in the mobile broadband sector. However, the strong presence of fixed 
broadband services in these countries could lead us to believe that the potential for the 
mobile broadband market is very high. As shown in Figure 12, the percentage of 
broadband services in relation to GNP significantly exceeds that of fixed telephony and 
mobile services, which makes it very attractive for any mobile phone company to 
expand its operations and provide this service. 
 
Figure 11   Internet and mobile broadband penetration percentage in 2008 
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Figure 12  Spending on the different telecommunications services as a percentage of GNP in      
                                                                             the year 2008 
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                                                                GNP in 2008 























This paper aims to identify the main regulatory aspects associated with policies on 
spectrum use and allocation which have led to greater competition in the 
telecommunications sector in Central American countries: Costa Rica (CRC), El 
Salvador (ESA), Guatemala (GUA), Nicaragua (NCA) and Panama (PAN). 
 
In the sections above, we found evidence that for Central American countries, increased 
spectrum allocation is positively associated with price reduction in the mobile 
telecommunications sector, which reduces the degree of measured concentration and 
results in improved mobile phone penetration rates in Central American countries. We 
also found evidence of how the regulatory framework for spectrum management and 
use has implications for consumer welfare and efficiency in the sector, since spectrum 
is an essential input in the production process of telecommunications services. Finally, 
we found evidence that lower prices in mobile telecommunications also involve 
improvements in the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) (fixed 
and mobile telephony, and broadband), which is reflected in an improved ICT 
development index for the region as a result of lower prices of ICT services. 
 
From this evidence, it is clear that the spectrum management model in Central America 
must be improved so that it is suited to the economic, technological and market 
contexts and contributes to optimizing spectrum use and maximizing the welfare 
provided by the telecommunications sector. 
 
It must be pointed out that the countries with a market-oriented regulation model are 
the ones that have been able to obtain the highest growth rates and lowest prices in the 
mobile telephony sector. In particular, allocating greater amounts of spectrum through 
the auction process for exploitation by those who value it the most results in fast, 
transparent, profitable allocation for countries. Furthermore, greater spectrum releases 
have facilitated the entry of new competitors, which encourages lower prices through 
competition.  
However, not all regulatory authorities have managed to respond to the needs of 
operators in a timely manner, particularly Costa Rica and Nicaragua, so the 
implementation of regulations in force is hindering the full development of mobile 
telecommunications.  
International experience and economic theory strongly support the idea of migrating 
from a "command-and-control" model to one based on market mechanisms, 
particularly when technological progress allows services to have different functions, 
reduce differences between services and provide services that the networks were not 
originally designed for.  
The design of an integrated policy for spectrum management should be based on the 
idea of allowing network owners to make full use of infrastructure so that they can 
provide the services they want to. 
In this regard, wide allocation of spectrum through public auctions that facilitate the 
entry of new operators, and the removal of regulatory barriers to contribute to 
flexibility of spectrum use by a licensee and potential spectrum trading in a secondary 
market look in principle as key instruments of a spectrum allocation and management 
policy that will support the development of the telecommunications services sector.  
Against the background described in the main body of the document, it becomes 
apparent that governments in the region need to define a set of clear policies regarding 
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